

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

TOP SECRET // NOFORN

During the post-September 11 investigation, the FBI discovered that al-Bayoumi had far more extensive ties to the Saudi Government than previously realized. In fact, according to an October 14, 2002 FBI document, al-Bayoumi has "extensive ties to the Saudi Government." The connections identified by the FBI are:

- Al-Bayoumi had been an accountant at the Saudi Civil Aviation Administration from 1975 to 1993, when he relocated to the United States;
- According to the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in frequent contact with the Emir of the Saudi Ministry of Defense, responsible for air traffic control;
- The FBI has also located records, indicating that al-Bayoumi received \$20,000 from the Saudi Ministry of Finance at one point;
- When al-Bayoumi applied to schools in the United States in 1998, he had a letter from the Saudi Embassy, which stated that he was getting a full scholarship from the Government of Saudi Arabia; and
- While in San Diego, al-Bayoumi was receiving money from the Saudi Ministry of Defense through a Saudi company called "Erkan." [REDACTED] of that company informed the FBI after September 11, 2001 that, although al-Bayoumi only showed up at the company on one occasion, he received a monthly salary and allowances. [REDACTED] stated that, at first, he attempted to refuse to pay al-Bayoumi a monthly salary, but he was told that his company would lose their contract if he did not pay him. [REDACTED] informed the FBI that at the time, he attributed this to Saudi corruption.

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation
FOIA 5 USC §552(B)(7)(D)

Al-Bayoumi also had frequent contact with Saudi establishments in the United States. In a review of telephone toll records, the FBI learned that al-Bayoumi called Saudi Government establishments in the United States almost 100 times between January and May of 2000. According to the FBI, al-Bayoumi was in contact with at least three individuals at the Saudi

TOP SECRET // NOFORN

223

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

TOP SECRET//SI//REL TO USA, UK, FVEY

Embassy in Washington, DC; two individuals at the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission in Washington, DC; and three individuals at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles. In a search of Bayoumi's [REDACTED] [REDACTED], they also discovered that he had the phone number for an individual at the Saudi Consulate in London.*

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Two former San Diego agents addressed the issue of whether al-Bayoumi was an intelligence officer at the October 9, 2002 closed hearing. The former case agent who handled Mappi testified:

[Al-Bayoumi] acted like a Saudi intelligence officer, in my opinion. And if he was involved with the hijackers, which it looks like he was, if he signed leases, if he provided some sort of financing or payment of some sort, then I would say that there's a clear possibility that there might be a connection between Saudi intelligence and ISIL.

A former Assistant Special Agent in Charge in San Diego testified that the FBI received "numerous, I would say half a dozen" reports from individuals who believed that al-Bayoumi was a Saudi intelligence officer. The FBI's November 18th response is inconsistent as to whether the FBI currently is designating al-Bayoumi as a suspected Saudi intelligence officer. In its response, the FBI notes that al-Bayoumi [REDACTED] until after September 11th, but the response also states that "there is no evidence" to conclude that al-Bayoumi is a Saudi intelligence officer.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d)

The FBI had received reporting from a reliable source well prior to September 11, 2001 indicating that al-Bayoumi might be a Saudi intelligence officer. Al-Bayoumi was known to have access to large amounts of money from Saudi Arabia, despite the fact that he did not appear to hold a job. On one occasion prior to September 11, the FBI received information that al-Bayoumi had received \$400,000 from Saudi Arabia to help fund a new mosque in San Diego. The FBI conducted a counterterrorism investigation on al-Bayoumi in 1998 and 1999, but closed the investigation at that point.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

Since September 11, 2001 FBI investigation revealed that al-Bayoumi has some ties to terrorist elements. Pasquale J. D'Anato, the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and Counterintelligence testified in the October 9, 2002 hearing that:

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d)

[We] have been talking with the [redacted] Government about collection on an individual named [redacted] who has ties to al-Qaeda, who has ties to Bayoumi.

In addition, the FBI reported the results of their search of al-Bayoumi's [redacted] that, after an exhaustive translations of Bayoumi's documents, it is clear that in Bayoumi's correspondence he is providing guidance to young Muslims and some of his writings can be interpreted as jihadist."

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

According to information acquired by the FBI after September 11, 2001, al-Bayoumi also noted on one of his school applications that he worked for a company called "Dallah/Avco." According to the FBI, Ercan is a San Diego subcontractor of Dallah/Avco. According to a separate [redacted] document, Dallah and Avco are under the same umbrella company, Avco/Dallah-Trus Arab, which is a subsidiary of Al Barakat Investment and Development Company. Avco/Dallah reportedly holds the contracts for cleaning and maintenance at the three major airports in Saudi Arabia. The [redacted] document states that [redacted] the company has links to Usama Bin Laden. FBI Headquarters was informed of the affiliation between Dallah/Avco and Al Barakat in February 2001, but the San Diego Field Office apparently never got this information.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

According to FBI documents, al-Bayoumi's pay increased during the time that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar were in the United States. According to a recent [redacted] analysis of ties between the terrorist attacks and elements of the Saudi Government, before al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar arrived in the U.S., al-Bayoumi generally received approximately \$465 per month in "allowances." According to the [redacted] document, in March 2000, a month after al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar arrived in San Diego, his "allowances" jumped to over \$3700 a month and stayed constant until December 2000, when al-Hazmi left San Diego. Al-Bayoumi's allowances were then decreased to approximately \$3,200 a month and stayed at that rate until al-Bayoumi left the United States in August 2001, approximately one month before the September 11th attacks.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

The [redacted] memorandum dated July 2, 2002, incorrectly noted that al-Bayoumi's wife, while living in San Diego, was receiving \$1200 a month from Princess Hafsa bint Sultan, the wife of Prince Bandar, the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. The FBI has now confirmed that only Osama Bassnan's wife received money directly from Prince Bandar's wife, but that al-Bayoumi's wife attempted to deposit three of the checks from Prince Bandar's wife, which were payable to Bassnan's wife, into her own accounts.

The Joint Inquiry also found, in FBI files, information suggesting that Osama Bassnan may have also been in contact with al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi, including:

- Bassnan was a very close associate of Omer al-Bayoumi's and was in telephone contact with al-Bayoumi several times a day while they were both in San Diego. Bassnan also has close ties to a number of other individuals connected to the hijackers, including Omar Bakarbhush, discussed below, who is referred to in FBI documents as Bassnan's brother-in-law;
- According to an October 16, 2001 FBI document, Bassnan informed an asset that he had met Nawaf al-Hazmi through al-Bayoumi. He went on to say that he met two of the nineteen hijackers through Omer al-Bayoumi. According to the FBI document, he also told the asset that al-Bayoumi was arrested because he knew al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar very well. The document goes on to state that Bassnan and al-Bayoumi may have been "close to each other for a long time."
- Bassnan lived in the apartment complex in San Diego across the street from al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar;
- Bassnan made a confession to an FBI source after the September 11 attacks suggesting that he did more for the hijackers than al-Bayoumi did;

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

TOP SECRET

- The FBI is aware of contact between the hijackers and a close friend of Bassnan's, Khaled al-Kayed, a commercial airline pilot and certified flight instructor living in San Diego. Al-Kayed admitted to the FBI that in May 2000, al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi contacted him about learning to fly Boeing jet aircraft.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(e)(d)

FBI documents speculate that Osamia Bassnan [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The FBI's November 18, 2002 response contends that this was an early investigative theory based on asset reporting which the FBI has not been able to corroborate. However, there is also additional information possibly tying Bassnan to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] In 1992, while he was living in Washington, D.C., Bassnan listed his employment as the Saudi Arabian Education Mission. FBI documents state that [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Bassnan also has other ties to the Saudi Government. Bassnan's wife received a monthly stipend from Princess Haifa. In a recent search of Bassnan's residence, the FBI located copies of 31 cashier's checks totaling \$74,000, during the period February 21, 1999 to May 30, 2002. These checks were payable to Bassnan's wife and were drawn on the Riggs Bank account of Prince Bandar's wife. The FBI has determined that there has been a standing order on Princess Haifa's account since January 1999 to send \$2000 a month to Bassnan's wife. Bassnan's wife was allegedly receiving the funding for "nursing services," but, according to the [REDACTED] document, there is no evidence that Bassnan's wife provided nursing services. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

On at least one occasion, Bassnan received a check directly from Prince Bandar's account. According to the FBI, on May 14, 1998, Bassnan cashed a check from Bandar in the amount of \$15,000. Bassnan's wife also received at least one check directly from Bandar. She also received one additional check from Bandar's wife, which she cashed on January 8, 1998, for \$10,000.

Withheld under statutory authority of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C., section 3507)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

In the October 9, 2002 hearing FBI Executive Assistant Director D'Amore commented on this finding:

I believe that we do have money going from Bandar's wife, \$2,000 a month up to about \$64,000. What the money was for is what we don't know."

[redacted] testified

[redacted] She gives money to a lot of different groups and people from around the world. We've been able to uncover a number of these... but maybe if we can discover that she gives to 20 different radical groups, well, gee, maybe there's a pattern here.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

The FBI has also developed additional information clearly indicating that Bassnan is an extremist and supporter of Usama Bin Laden. In 1993, the FBI became aware that Bassnan had hosted a party for the Blind Shaykh at his house in Washington, DC in October 1992. Bassnan has made many laudatory remarks to FBI assets about Bin Laden, referring to Bin Laden as the official Khalifate and the ruler of the Islamic world. According to an FBI asset, Bassnan spoke of Bin Laden "as if he were a god." Bassnan also stated to an FBI asset that he heard that the U.S. Government had stopped approving visas for foreign students. He considered such measures to be insufficient as there are already enough Muslims in the United States to destroy the United States and make it an Islamic state within ten to fifteen years. According to FBI documents, Bassnan also knew Bin Laden's family in Saudi Arabia and speaks on his mobile telephone with members of the family who are living in the United States.

Phone Numbers Linking Abu Zubaida to a Company in the United States and a Saudi Diplomat in Washington

On March 28, 2002 U.S. and coalition forces retrieved the telephone book of Abu Zubaida, whom the U.S. Government has identified as a senior al-Qaeda operational coordinator. According to an FBI document, "a review of toll records has linked several of the numbers found in Zubaida's phone book with U.S. phone numbers." One of the numbers is unlisted and subscribed to by the ASPCO Corporation in Aspen, Colorado. On July 15, 2002,

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

FBI Headquarters sent a lead to the Denver Field Office requesting that it investigate this connection. On September 19, 2002 agents of the Denver Field Office responded, stating that they had completed their initial investigation.

According to the FBI's Denver Office, ASPCOL is the umbrella corporation that manages the affairs of the Colorado residence of Prince Bandar, the Saudi ambassador to the United States. The facility is protected by Scimitar Security. Agents of the Denver Field Office noted that neither ASPCOL nor Scimitar Security is listed in the phone book or is easily locatable. In addition, the Colorado Secretary of State's office has no record of ASPCOL. The Denver office did not attempt to make any local inquiries about ASPCOL, as they believed that any inquiries regarding ASPCOL would be quickly known by Prince Bandar's employees. Due to the sensitivity of this matter, they decided to hold their investigation of ASPCOL in abeyance until they received additional guidance from FBI Headquarters.

According to the FBI, the phone number of an individual named [REDACTED] of McLean, Virginia was found within the effects of Abu Zubaida. [REDACTED] is reportedly a bodyguard at the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC. The FBI now suspects that he may be a [REDACTED]. In a September 17, 2002 document, the FBI notes that the Bureau is opening an investigation on [REDACTED] due to the size and value of his residence and his suspicious activity in approaching U.S. Intelligence Community personnel. It also appears that [REDACTED] has been in contact with [REDACTED], which is located at [REDACTED] in McLean, Virginia. The FBI has identified this address as the address of Prince Bandar. According to the FBI, [REDACTED] is officially a driver for the Saudi Embassy. [REDACTED] number was also linked to ASPCOL, Prince Bandar's umbrella company located in Colorado.

It should be noted that the FBI's November 13, 2002 response states that "CIA traces have revealed no direct (emphasis added) links between numbers found in Zubaida's phone book and numbers in the United States."

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d)

~~TOP SECRET~~

229

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

The U.S. Government also located another Virginia number at an Osama Bin Laden safehouse in Pakistan. The number is subscribed to by an individual named [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] was interviewed by the FBI in June 2002. He could not explain why his number ended up at a safehouse in Pakistan, but stated that he regularly provides services to a couple who are personal assistants to Prince Bandar. This couple's driver is an individual named [REDACTED], who is assigned to the Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C. According to [REDACTED] regularly called [REDACTED] business and frequently travels back and forth to Pakistan.

Other Saudi Government Officials in the United States Who May Have Been in Contact with the September 11 Hijackers

Among the individuals who may have been associates of the al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar was Shaykh al-Thumairy. According to the [REDACTED] memorandum, reviewed by the Joint Inquiry Staff, "initial indications are that al-Thumairy may have had a physical or financial connection to al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar, but we are still looking at this possibility." Al-Thumairy is an accredited diplomat at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is also considered one of the "imams" at the King Fahad Mosque in Culver City, California. [REDACTED]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

According to FBI documents, the King Fahad mosque was built in 1998 from funding from the Saudi Arabian Crown Prince Abdullah. The mosque is attended by members of the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles and is widely known for its anti-Western views. FBI documents indicate that Muhdar Abdallah drove al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar to the King Fahad Mosque before al-Mihdhar returned to Saudi Arabia.

Several individuals on the East Coast whom the hijackers may have met may also had connections to the Saudi Government. After the terrorist attacks, the FBI discovered that, during September 2001, an individual named Saleh al-Hussayen stayed at the same hotel in Herndon, Virginia where al-Hazmi was staying at the time. According to FBI documents, al-Hussayen is apparently a "Saudi Interior Ministry employee/official." He claimed not to know the hijackers.

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation
FOIA 5 USC §552(B)(7)(D)

~~TOP SECRET~~

-430-

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

but agents in the FBI's Washington Field Office believed he was being deceptive. The interview was terminated when al-Hussayen either passed out or signed a seizure requiring medical treatment. He was released from the hospital several days later and managed to depart the United States despite law enforcement efforts to locate and re-interview him.

Saleh al-Hussayen is the uncle of Saadi Omar al-Hussayen. Saadi al-Hussayen is connected to the Islamic Assembly of North America (IANA) and is the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation. The FBI has also discovered that Saleh al-Hussayen is a major contributor to the IANA, a non-profit organization based in Michigan that is dedicated to the spread of Islam worldwide. According to the FBI, the IANA's mission is actually to spread Islamic fundamentalism and Salafist doctrine throughout the United States and the world at large. The IANA solicits funds from wealthy Saudi benefactors, extremist Islamic Shaykhs, and suspect non-governmental organizations. According to FBI documents, IANA has solicited money from Prince Bandar, but the documents are unclear as to whether Bandar actually contributed money to this organization.

FBI documents also indicate that several Saudi Naval officers were in contact with the September 11 hijackers. FBI documents state that the San Diego Field Office opened a counterterrorism investigation on an individual named Osama Neoh, a Saudi Naval officer, due to his association with Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar. In addition, Lea al-Hurki, another Saudi Naval officer, was in telephonic contact with flight 77 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi on nine occasions from March 11, 2000 to March 27, 2000.

The Jacksonville FBI Field Office is conducting an investigation to determine whether Saleh Ahmed Bedaiwi, a Saudi Naval officer within its territory was in contact with any of the hijackers. [REDACTED]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(d)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

TOP SECRET

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

The FBI has also discovered some more tenuous connections between Saudi Government personnel and the hijackers during the course of the PENTAGON investigation. For example, according to the FBI, an individual named Fahed Abdullah Salih Balkhi was close friends with September 11 hijackers Ahmed al-Ghamdi and Ramzi al-Ghamdi. Balkhi previously "worked as a pilot for the Saudi Royal family, flying Usama Bin Laden between Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia during UBL's exile." In addition, an FBI source stated after September 11 that he/she was 50% sure that al-Mihdhar was a visitor at an apartment in McLean, Virginia that was occupied in July and August 2001 by Hamad Alotaibi of the Saudi Embassy Military Division. FBI documents also note that September 11 hijacker Saeed Alghamdi may have also visited the address.

Connections Between Saudi Government Officials in the United States and Other Possible Terrorist Operatives

The Joint Inquiry also reviewed information in FBI files suggesting other possible connections between Saudi Government officials and terrorist operatives.

For example, according to FBI documents, there is evidence that hijackers Marwan al-Shehhi and Mohammad Atta were in contact with Mohammed Raouq Qudair Harunani, the subject of an FBI counterterrorism investigation since 1999 and a close associate of Abdallah Bin Laden, who is referred to in FBI documents as Usama Bin Laden's half brother. Abdallah Bin Laden, who is the subject of several FBI investigations, is currently in the United States [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] He claims to work for the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, DC as an administrative officer. Abdallah Bin Laden has financed Quadir's company and is listed by Quadir as the emergency contact for Quadir's children. They are in frequent email and phone contact as well.

Withheld from public release
under statutory authority
of the Department of State
8 USC §1202(f)

432

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

According to the FBI, Abdullah Bin Laden has a number of connections to terrorist organizations. He is the President and Director of the World Arab Muslim Youth Association (WAMY) and the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Sciences in America. Both organizations are local branches of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. According to the FBI, there is reason to believe that WAMY is "closely associated with the funding and financing of international terrorist activities and in the past has provided logistical support to individuals wishing to fight in the Afghan War." In 1998, the CIA published a paper characterizing WAMY as a NGO that provides funding, logistical support and training with possible connections to the Arab Afghans network, Hamas, Algerian extremists, and Philippine militants.²

Also of potential interest, at least in retrospect, is the 1999 incident involving Mahanur al-Qudhaeain and Hamdan al-Shalawi. Al-Qudhaeain and al-Shalawi were flying from Phoenix to Washington, DC to attend a party at the Saudi Embassy. After they boarded the plane in Phoenix, they began asking the flight attendants technical questions about the flight that the flight attendants found suspicious. When the plane was in flight, al-Qudhaeain asked where the bathroom was; one of the flight attendants pointed him to the back of the plane. Nevertheless, al-Qudhaeain went to the front of the plane and attempted on two occasions to enter the cockpit. The plane made an emergency landing and the FBI investigated the incident, but decided not to pursue a prosecution. At the time, al-Qudhaeain and al-Shalawi claimed that the Saudi Embassy paid for their airplane tickets.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)

After the FBI discovered that an individual in Phoenix who was the subject of a counterterrorism investigation was driving al-Shalawi's car, the Bureau opened a counterterrorism investigation on al-Shalawi. In November 2000, the FBI received reporting from [REDACTED] that al-Shalawi had trained at the terrorist camps in Afghanistan and had received explosives training to perform "Khebar Towers"-type attacks. After the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Phoenix Field Office attached even potentially greater significance to that 1999 incident. A Phoenix FBI communication explained the theory behind this: "Phoenix FBI now

² According to the FBI's November 13, 2002 response, although several officials in WAMY support al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, the intelligence is insufficient to show whether the organization as a whole and its senior leadership support terrorism.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

believes both men were specifically attempting to test the security procedures of America West Airlines in preparation for and in furtherance of UBL/AQ's operations."

In testimony before the Joint Inquiry, the agent who drafted the "Phoenix EC" stated:

In a post 9/11 world, I went back and looked at that as possibly being some sort of dry run. It is currently under investigation.

After September 11, 2001, al-Qudhaeain [REDACTED]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d)

In interviews, a Phoenix FBI agent stated that Phoenix [REDACTED] believed that al-Qudhaeain might be [REDACTED]. His profile is similar to that of al-Bakourni and Basijan. He is in the United States as a student and does not have a visible means of income. He is in frequent contact with Saudi Government establishments in the United States and appears to be very involved in the affairs of the local Saudi community. He runs a "Saudi Club" in Phoenix, and assists Saudi students in the area. The FBI has also developed information that al-Qudhaeain was receiving money from the Saudi Government but, as of August 2002, had not obtained the relevant bank records for review. The FBI's Phoenix Field Office has speculated that al-Qudhaeain and others may be [REDACTED]

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)

There are other indications in FBI files that elements of the Saudi Government may have provided support to terrorist networks. For example, the FBI had identified the Ibu Tamayah Mosque in Culver City as a site of extremist-related activity both before and after September 11. Several subjects of San Diego investigation prior to September 11 had close connections to the mosque. Based on interviews and review of FBI files, San Diego FBI agents believed at the time that these subjects were laundering money through this mosque first to Somali non-profit organizations and then to other entities affiliated with Osama Bin Laden.

~~TOP SECRET~~

In approximately 1998, the FBI became aware of millions of dollars in wire transfers from the Somali community in San Diego to Al Barakaat Trading Company and other businesses affiliated with Usama Bin Laden. At the time, the funding appeared to be originating from the local Somali community in the form of donations to various Somali non-profits. However, the FBI now believes that some of the funding actually originated from Saudi Arabia and that both the Ibn Tamiyah Mosque in Los Angeles and the Islamic Center of San Diego were involved in laundering the money.

According to the former FBI agent in San Diego who was involved in this investigation, this scheme may allow the Saudi Government to provide al-Qa'ida with funding through covert or indirect means. In his October 9, 2002 testimony the former agent commented on the possible money laundering:

My guess Saudi-it's connected somehow with the Saudis. And knowing that probably 70-80 percent of the population of Saudi Arabia support Usama Bin Laden, it might be an indication.

There are also indications of Saudi governmental support for terrorist activity through charitable organizations. The Saudi-based Umm al-Qura Islamic Charitable Foundation (UQ) is an Islamic non-governmental organization linked to terrorist support activities. According to a May 2002 Defense Intelligence Terrorism Summary, the UQ's activities in support of terrorism include: suspicious money transfers, document forgery, providing jobs to wanted terrorist suspects, and financing travel for youths to attend jihad training. The Defense communication notes that since September 2001, UQ couriers have transported over \$330,000 in cash, most of which they received from Saudi Embassies in the Far East. In January 2002, UQ administrator Yassir El-Sayid Mohammed traveled to Thailand to pick up approximately \$200,000 from the Saudi Embassy in Bangkok. In early November 2001, the personal assistant to the UQ administrator traveled to Kuala Lumpur for a meeting at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. He returned with tens of thousands of dollars, according to the Department of Defense.

CIA, Treasury, and FBI officials have all expressed their concern about the al-Haramain Foundation's ties to both the Saudi Government and terrorist activity. According to the FBI's

~~TOP SECRET~~~~TOP SECRET~~