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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Interviewee: Prince Turki bin Faisal bin Abdul Aziz  
Location: Saudi Arabian Embassy, London  
Date: October 29, 30, 2003  
Participants: Philip Zelikow (9-11 Commission)  
Dieter Snell (9-11 Commission)  
Also present: Saud Alsati (KSA Embassy)  
Dylan Cors (NSC minder)  
Writeup by: Dieter Snell  
Reviewed by: Philip Zelikow  
Date of writeup: November 4, 2003

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### Introduction

The meeting consisted of two sessions, the first of which commenced at approximately 12:40 pm on October 29, 2003 and lasted for approximately 2 ½ hours; the second of which commenced at approximately 2:00 pm on October 30 and lasted for approximately 1 ¼ hours.

At the outset of the initial session, PZ described the Commission, its makeup and mission, for the Prince contrasting the Commission's approach with that of the Congressional Joint Inquiry, which the Prince immediately identified as being the source of the sealed 28 pages. PZ emphasized that the Commission, unlike the Joint Inquiry, is speaking with Saudis to get their side of the story.

When asked about ground rules he wanted for future use by the Commission of any statements made by him during the interview, the Prince expressed the wish to be provided the opportunity to clear any statements that the Commission intends to attribute to him.

PZ noted that the KSA officials interviewed by the Commission in Riyadh stated that they now consider London to be the home of the most dangerous terrorist figures. The Prince noted his agreement with this assessment and said that he has called this fact to the attention of the British authorities, who have responded that legal restrictions prevent them from doing more in the way of enforcement on this front.

### Background

The Prince began his career as Director of the Saudi Intelligence Service in 1977 and retired from that position on August 31, 2001. In 1980, the KSA embarked on a joint

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effort with the United States and Pakistan – referred to by the Prince and herein as the “tri-partite agreement” – to drive the Soviets from Afghanistan. The agreement involved close work among the three nations to funnel arms, supplies, training, medicine, and food to the mujahedeen in Afghanistan, through covert means so that Pakistan would not incur problems at the hands of the Soviets. The program lasted from 1980 until 1990 and was, in the Prince’s estimation, a success.

The effort to remove the Soviets from Afghanistan attracted support from all over the world, from Muslims and non-Muslims alike. One such supporter was UBL, who left his university in c. 1983-84 to travel to Peshawar, where he volunteered to help the mujahedeen. In this regard, UBL was one of thousands of such supporters who converged on Pakistan and Afghanistan. His distinguishing feature was the amount of money at his disposal, which gave him particular credibility in persuading others to contribute as well. In addition to money, UBL contributed engineering and construction services for major projects undertaken by the mujahedeen, to wit, buildings, wells, etc.

By the mid-1980s, UBL was coordinating his activities with Abdullah Azzam, the leading recruiter, whose “pure jihad” interpretation called for the defense of Muslim countries victimized by invasion, a doctrine that applied mostly to Afghanistan. Azzam did not consider Palestine, by contrast, to be so clear cut a case, despite his Palestinian origin.

Together, Azzam and UBL established a “welcome house” in Peshawar, mainly using UBL’s money. Another participant in this effort was Zawahiri, who had just been released from an Egyptian prison.

Prince Turki believes there is a popular misconception that the 7 mujahedeen factions received equal treatment under the tri-partite project. In fact, each of the groups was graded with respect to its efficacy, so that the three countries’ support could be distributed most advantageously. The groups led by Hekmatyar and Rabbani consistently received the highest scores under this grading system (which actually used points) and therefore received the largest amount of support, always equal as between the two of them. This review was performed on an ongoing basis because Afghans were well known for switching their allegiances precipitously.

**Meetings with UBL**

Prince Turki first met UBL in c. 1985-86, at a reception held by the KSA embassy in Islamabad. By that time, UBL already was considered to be a great supporter of the mujahedeen and was respected by all 7 mujahedeen factions.

By 1988, the impending withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan had become obvious. It was approximately at this point when UBL had a falling out with Azzam due to their divergent views on the proper role of jihad. For his part, UBL increasingly

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supported the more militant Zawahiri model, inspired by the *gamat al-islamiyah*, which pitted "true Muslims" against the rest of the world. This was the so-called *takfiri* doctrine.

In response to a question as to whether he ever developed any working relationship with UBL, the Prince stated that he never did; rather, his work was to further the tri-partite effort of the KSA, US, and Pakistan to push the Soviets out of Afghanistan through covert assistance to the mujahedeen. Working with UBL directly would have risked exposure of the KSA role to the Soviets. For the same reason, the Prince denied the existence of any US-UBL relationship during the 1980s.

UBL's fame was on the rise, and by 1988 he was receiving considerable media attention, not just in the Arab world, but also from Time and Newsweek, one of which, the Prince recalls, did a profile of UBL during this timeframe. By this point, UBL had become a celebrity not only in the KSA, but in much of the Muslim world. All doors would be open to him.

Prince Turki met UBL a total of 3-4 times in Pakistan and once in the KSA. On the last occasion, which occurred in c. 1989-90 (i.e., before Saddam invaded Kuwait), UBL offered to use his large assemblage of mujahedeen to help the KSA eliminate the Marxist regime in South Yemen. The Prince reacted coolly to UBL's proposal, mainly because the KSA was interested in pursuing a policy of diplomatic engagement rather than one of military action.

UBL impressed the Prince as a very quiet, amicable person who said little and spoke in a low voice. Other words used by the Prince to describe UBL are "shy," "amiable," and "courteous." In the October 30 session, Prince Turki was asked how he thought UBL could have succeeded in arrogating unto himself the status of a respected religious figure. In response, the Prince likened UBL to Savonarola, an "illiterate priest" who evolved into a charismatic demagogue.

After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, UBL again approached the KSA government with an offer of military assistance, approaching Prince Sultan (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense) with a proposal that UBL lead a mujahedeen force to drive Saddam from Kuwait. The proposal (which Prince Turki did not hear personally) was presented as an alternative to relying on the US to perform this function. The KSA government's response was "thanks but no thanks." At the time, UBL's proposal and its rejection were not considered major issues.

**Aftermath of Afghan-Soviet War**

Following the Soviets' withdrawal from Afghanistan, the mujahedeen groups began fighting among themselves and the tri-partite project to support them ended. During this period (i.e., the early 1990s), many Saudi jihad participants left Afghanistan. UBL

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himself was seen as "an appendage of Afghanistan" and no one questioned his loyalty to the KSA government or his sense of Saudi nationalism.

By 1991-92 (when UBL returned to Afghanistan), UBL was giving sermons in mosques and schools – some of which were being broadcast on Arab TV – expounding on the need for Muslims to fight against US hegemonistic intentions vis-à-vis the Muslim world. When these speeches came to the attention of the KSA government, UBL was called in to the Ministry of the Interior and was cautioned against making any further public speeches without permission.\* The Prince believes this caution was administered at the local level, probably in Jeddah, where UBL was living. Now UBL "was on everyone's radar."

Asked who he considers to have been responsible for the assassination of Azzam, the Prince stated that he has always believed the culprits to be Afghans unhappy about Azzam's criticism of some of their conduct. Whenever the Prince would meet with mujahedeen in Pakistan, he would hear repeated pleas for more arms, money, food and supplies, but also would be implored not to send any more men. Although the mujahedeen welcomed UBL (due to his money), they considered other foreign would-be jihadis a nuisance that drained available supplies without making any real contribution.

On this point, the Prince stressed that UBL himself did not really do any fighting, contrary to the popular myth that has emerged about him, which the Prince attributes to UBL's campaign of "self-glorification." Indeed, in an interview published in Pakistan in a 1988-89 mujahedeen pamphlet, UBL recounted his "role" in the famous battle of Jagee (near Khowst). According to the interview, UBL fell asleep in the bunker during the fierce Soviet attack; when he awoke he found the Soviets had been routed, a triumph he credited to the intervention of "angels." According to Prince Turki, UBL was never anything approaching a field commander.

Prince Turki recalls KSA government reporting that establishes the formation of Al-Qaeda in or around 1990. When asked whether he considers it possible that the organization could have been formed as early as 1988, as some reporting indicates, the Prince acknowledged that this could be so.

Returning to the timeline, the Prince said that the admonition UBL received regarding his sermons included a requirement that he obtain permission from the local Mabathith before undertaking any foreign travel. Complying, UBL obtained permission to return to Afghanistan in 1992-93 to help end the civil war that had broken out there. After a short time in Afghanistan, however, UBL went to the Sudan and issued his first fax

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\* Asked to explain the relationship between the Intelligence Service and the Mabathith of the Ministry of the Interior, Prince Turki described the former as a "double check" for any information being conveyed to the KSA government leadership. The Prince himself reported directly to the King on internal matters, but played no role regarding police matters. Both his service and the Mabathith had external and internal dimensions. Whatever information the Mabathith collected outside the KSA was shared with the Intelligence Service.

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communication calling for the expulsion of all infidel forces from the holy soil of the KSA. The fax was sent to Saudi newspapers and various prominent Saudis.

**UBL in the Sudan**

The Prince believes that Hassan Al-Turabi probably invited UBL to come to the Sudan when Turabi and UBL were together in Afghanistan in 1992. Upon arriving in the Sudan, UBL established a bank (with Turabi) and built a highway to the coast. In return, Turabi gave UBL favored status among the "aggrieved" foreigners whom he had invited to the Sudan. The Prince thinks this treatment, plus the reputation for virtue and righteousness UBL had cultivated, went to his head around this time.

In March 1994, the KSA stripped UBL of his citizenship in the wake of his continued criticisms of the government. Well before this time, UBL's own family members were upset with him, and several of them, including his brothers, mother, and uncle (the oldest and therefore most prominent member of the family) tried to get him to stop making trouble and stay in the KSA. These efforts failed, however, and UBL's faxes and leaflets kept coming.

Although Prince Turki reported information gathered on UBL, he did not himself sit on the committee that eventually would strip UBL of citizenship. Nor did he make such a recommendation. Even before the citizenship decision, UBL's own family publicly disowned him, actually taking out advertisements in newspapers and announcing this – a rare event that garnered wide attention. They also expropriated his assets.

During 1993-96, the Prince received Egyptian intelligence reports concerning UBL's supposed financing of terrorist activities in Egypt, and about the Sudan harboring insurgents, including Algerian and Libyan dissidents.

The Prince denied that the KSA ever tried to kill UBL; rather, he believes that some Sudanese individuals might have staged an assassination attempt in an effort to scare UBL. He then erected a wall around his residence and received protection from the Sudanese government. A group called "Ahal a Sunna" (ph) came to mind as possibly responsible for the attempt. The Prince does not suspect any Egyptian involvement. He also expressed the view that the negatives of a bungled assassination attempt outweigh the benefits of a successful one.

In 1996, the Sudanese offered to deliver UBL to the KSA, in a meeting between Hassan Al-Bashir and Crown Prince Abdullah. However, Bashir insisted that UBL not be prosecuted. The Crown Prince responded that no one is above the law, so no such assurance could be given. Prince Turki has heard that the Sudanese made a similar offer to the Clinton administration, but that the US government at that time did not consider the evidence amassed against UBL sufficient to convict him. After these overtures, the Sudanese sent UBL to Afghanistan. Prince Turki believes that he told the US about the

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Sudanese rendition offer. He specifically denies that the KSA refused to take UBL – just the opposite was the case. He also denies having any idea at that time that UBL would go to Afghanistan.

After leaving the Sudan, UBL went to Jalalabad and settled with Younis Khalis, whom Prince Turki described as “one of the most sincere and straightforward Afghans I’ve ever met.” (The Prince also referred to Khalis as lacking in guile and very religious.) UBL stayed with Khalis and together they joined up with the Taliban and facilitated their capture of Kabul.

In response to a follow-up question during the October 30 session regarding the possibility that UBL’s return to Afghanistan in 1996 may have been sponsored by Abu Sayaf or some sort of Saudi connection, the Prince denied having any information on this subject and pointed out that Younis Khalis was an ally of Rabbani, not the Taliban. The Prince reiterated that Saudi support for the mujahedeen was cut off as of 1990. The Prince also noted that Abu Sayaf and Hekmatyar opposed the KSA’s position regarding the 1990-1991 Gulf crisis; although Abu Sayaf originally supported “Desert Shield,” he subsequently reversed his position on this issue.

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At the time, Prince Turki did not suspect UBL as being responsible for the 1993 attacks against US forces in Somalia. Although UBL later took credit for those attacks, the Prince doubts that he had any role in them.

The UBL link to the 1995 OPM/SANG attack is considerably stronger in the Prince’s mind. He noted that the perpetrators read their confessions implicating UBL before they were executed.

**Post-Tri-Partite Agreement Policy re: Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda**

Following the conclusion of the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, the KSA no longer had the same close relationship with Pakistan that existed during the 1980s, although the KSA attempted to get the Pakistanis to help quiet the turmoil in Afghanistan. In late 1995, Prince Turki visited Rabbani and practically all of the mujahedeen leaders in an attempt to broker a resolution to their civil war. He also went to Russia to attempt to enlist the aid of Primakov, the head of Russian Intelligence, in this effort.

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With respect to UBL, the Prince pursued a policy of attempting to obtain as much information as possible regarding UBL's actions and intentions. This policy proved fairly unsuccessful, as UBL had become so suspicious and security conscious that he moved constantly.

When asked about the location of UBL's monetary assets, the Prince expressed his belief that UBL retained some funds outside the KSA, in the Sudan, Europe, and the United States, for example. The Prince noted that it did not cost UBL much to live in Afghanistan. He also observed that, while en route to Afghanistan from the Sudan, UBL stopped in Qatar; the Prince thinks the purpose of that stop may have been to pick up money.

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With the ending of the tri-partite project to support the mujahedeen effort, Saudi charitable contributions became an issue, especially out of a concern that such funds might be used to sustain the civil war in Afghanistan. In 1991-92, the KSA moved to restrict the flow of charitable funds to Afghanistan by requiring that contributions flow through a central committee in Riyadh. (When asked during the October 30 session to provide more detail on this point, Prince Turki indicated that his assistant, Saud Alsati, would supply the Commission with printouts showing the KSA's efforts to follow the trail of Saudi charitable contributions.) While some funds transfers may have continued to occur through the transport of cash to Peshawar, they were substantially diminished. When the war in Bosnia broke out in 1993, a similar committee was established to handle that relief effort.

Prince Turki was always very concerned about the misuse of charitable funds for *takfiri* campaigns. Overall, he is not very satisfied with the KSA effort on this front, and always has believed that more needed to be done. He thinks that much was learned from the Bosnia experience and that the Kosovo relief effort proved more effective in controlling the flow of cash all the way down to the field.

Addressing the 1996 Khobar Towers attack, the Prince expressed confidence that UBL was not involved. He stated that the KSA and the US agreed that there would be no announcements concerning the investigation absent prior consultation, and complained that the US Department of Justice issued indictments unilaterally in derogation of that agreement.

The Prince said he took UBL very seriously as a dangerous figure from the early 1990s onward. He observed there to have been a lag of 2-3 years between the KSA's appreciation of the threat posed by UBL and the US's recognition of that threat (which he

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dated from the 1995 Riyadh bombings). Even after 1995, the US did not take UBL seriously until he announced the establishment of the Islamic Army.

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After 1997, the KSA became increasingly concerned about the influx of weapons from Yemen. Nashiri's name first came to Prince Turki's attention in this context, and re-surfaced during detainee interrogations that followed the East Africa embassy bombings. Attempts by the Ministry of the Interior to apprehend Nashiri in Yemen continued through 9/11, without success.

Prince Turki professed ignorance of any work or communication by the Mabathith regarding KSM in 1994. Nor is he aware of any definitive link between Al-Qaeda and either the 1993 World Trade Center bombing or the Bojinka conspiracy. The Prince also denied participating in any discussions of US-planned covert activities in Afghanistan.

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Asked during the October 30 session about KSA-Pakistan relations following 9/11, Prince Turki noted that the KSA and Pakistan historically have been close. After 9/11, the US asked the KSA to persuade the Pakistanis to cooperate completely with the US-led war on terrorism. Prior to 9/11, US-Pakistan relations showed some cooperation. For example, following the 1998 embassy bombings, Pakistan arrested and interrogated some suspects who had just returned from Kenya. The Prince believes that a tape of one such interrogation contained an admission of UBL involvement in the bombings, that the Pakistanis passed the tape to the US, and that the US attempted to use the tape to convince Mullah Omar to turn over UBL. The Prince also recalled handling a Pakistani request to persuade the US to increase its aid to Pakistan and to relax sanctions imposed by the first Bush administration in response to the Pakistani nuclear program, as a result of which the US was continuing to withhold delivery of F-16 fighter jets that the Pakistanis already had paid for. The Prince noted that the 1990s saw a succession of Pakistani regimes, and observed that the KSA interceded on behalf of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, permitting him to reside in the KSA in exile.

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### **Effort to Get UBL from Taliban**

By early 1998, Prince Turki was convinced of the need to apprehend UBL. In June 1998, Crown Prince Abdullah sent him to Afghanistan to persuade the Taliban to render UBL. Meeting with Mullah Omar in Kandahar, the Prince obtained an agreement in principle for a rendition. Only a legal pretext was still required, and a joint task force was established to fill this need. The following month, Mullah Omar's then advisor, Muttawakil came to Jeddah and met with the Crown Prince and Prince Turki to discuss the task force's progress. The upshot of the meeting was that Muttawakil would get back to the Saudis on how to effect a rendition of UBL. According to Prince Turki, the Americans were aware of this meeting.

Following the East African embassy bombings of August 7, 1998, the US threatened to impose sanctions against the Taliban if UBL were not handed over. The Tomahawk cruise missile attack followed shortly thereafter. When Muttawakil failed to return to the KSA as promised, the Crown Prince sent Prince Turki back to Kandahar in September 1998 to follow up with Mullah Omar on the joint committee. At this meeting, Mullah Omar denied the existence of any prior promise to hand over UBL and suggested that there may have been a problem with the translation. Prince Turki thought this position was an obvious dodge. The prior record was clear. While the Prince was arguing this point, Mullah Omar suddenly left the meeting, looking ill. When the Taliban leader returned 10-15 minutes later, the Prince continued to insist that an agreement had been reached; Mullah Omar then demanded to know why the KSA was persecuting UBL instead of working with the Taliban to drive the infidels out of the Holy Land. At this point, Prince Turki summarily ended the meeting and warned Mullah Omar that he was bringing harm not just upon himself but upon all of Afghanistan.

After returning to the KSA, Prince Turki recommended the suspension of all relations with the Taliban. The Crown Prince and the King accepted the recommendation, withdrawing all KSA representatives from Afghanistan and requesting that the Taliban withdraw their representatives from the KSA. KSA relations with the Taliban were thus suspended in September 1998. Subsequently, in late 1999 or early 2000, Prince Turki received a visit from Jalaluddin Haqqani, a prominent and extremist Pakistani Muslim leader who had been active in the Afghan jihad and who was seeking to improve relations. The Prince responded by saying that relations would improve once Mullah Omar decided to honor his commitment to hand over UBL. Although Haqqani promised to make an effort to meet this requirement, nothing further was heard from him.

In response to a question whether the KSA ever attempted to put pressure on Pakistan, Prince Turki stated that he was accompanied during his second visit to Afghanistan in 1998 by Naseem Rana, the head of ISI. After the meeting with Mullah Omar, the Prince told Rana that he would be recommending dissolution of diplomatic ties with the Taliban and urged Rana to do the same with respect to his government. Rana said he would make such a recommendation (but to no apparent effect).

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During the October 30 session, Prince Turki described Mullah Omar as being totally in charge of the Taliban government. Mullah Muhammad Rabbani (Mullah Omar's second in command) was largely incapacitated by an illness involving the nervous system, which necessitated his replacement and eventually killed him.

**Posner Book**

When the questioning turned to Prince Turki's reaction to Gerald Posner's Why America Slept, the Prince denied knowing anything about Abu Zubaida prior to the latter's capture. As far as he knows, Posner's account is an invention. The Prince claims never to have met Abu Zubaida and emphasized that UBL was not present at the Kandahar meetings with Mullah Omar. The Prince repeated that he himself last saw UBL in 1990.

Prince Turki denied any knowledge regarding the phone numbers of Saudi princes supposedly provided by Abu Zubaida while under interrogation. He pointed out, moreover, that none of the princes mentioned in the book had any connection to politics. As to the Pakistani air force general implicated in the Posner book, the Prince considers it highly unlikely that such a figure from the Pakistani military would have dealt with UBL, whose Pakistani interlocutors tended to be from the ISI.

**Lack of Advance Knowledge of 9/11 Attacks**

Asked about information that came to his attention regarding possible attacks during the period leading up to 9/11, Prince Turki stated that he heard warnings from the US and other foreign sources, starting in 2000 and specifically in February 2001. Based on these warnings, he fully expected any terrorist event to take place in the KSA against Saudi or US interests.

In the beginning of January 2000, the Prince recalled, he saw reporting on several meetings alleged to have occurred at that time in various venues, including London. With respect to the activities of Nawaf Al-Hazmi and Khalid Al-Mihdhar in Kuala Lumpur during this time frame, the Prince remembered seeing reporting about a meeting in KL but stated that Al-Hazmi was not yet identified as particularly notorious or specifically connected to UBL; rather, he simply was known to have traveled to Afghanistan and to have had some involvement in arms smuggling from Yemen.

In response a question about recent press reports quoting Prince Turki as claiming to have provided the US with information about Al-Hazmi and Al-Mihdhar in late 1999, the Prince acknowledged that he was incorrect on this issue, and that the KSA embassy in Washington, DC's recent statement that no such information was passed should be considered authoritative.

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## **Policy Overview**

In the aftermath of the embassy bombings, the KSA pursued a strategy of pressuring the Taliban to hand over UBL and to prevent additional harm. On the latter point, Prince Turki stressed that the KSA never gave Afghan groups any money from 1990 forward.

Looking back, Prince Turki noted a worldwide failure to anticipate the horror of 9/11 and a similar failure to get better information. The latter failure the Prince attributes primarily to an inability to infiltrate UBL's organization, despite efforts to do so. He faults the KSA for this failure, but also emphasized that Al-Qaeda was not made up only of Saudis.

With respect to the role of charities in funding Al-Qaeda, Prince Turki noted "a measure of naivete" regarding the failure of donors to demand details on how money would be spent.

When asked about the education system within the KSA, Prince Turki recognized the existence of some extremist elements. However, he described the 15 Saudis who participated in the 9/11 attacks as being more the product of a cult-like program developed in Afghanistan. The KSA, he emphasized, does not produce terrorists and is taking action to prevent such activities.

On the subject of the possible presence of fifth columnists within the KSA government (raised during the October 30 session), the Prince pointed out constraints imposed by Sharia against the investigation of anyone, whether they be inside or outside the government. Specifically, he noted that mere suspicion was a legally insufficient basis to take action against someone, and that false accusation itself amounts to a serious offense. He also pointed out the difficulty inherent in investigating people's intentions.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, reporting of problems involving dissidents is taken seriously by the KSA government, regardless of whether the dissidents themselves are within the royal family and/or the government. For the Intelligence Service, the primary requirement is evidence, which the Service attempts to collect while working in conjunction with the Mabahith. Summing up, the Prince stated that as of his departure from the Service at the end of August 2001, he did not believe a substantial internal problem existed. His main concern involved smuggling activities.

Asked for his perspective on the recruiting of Al-Qaeda members such as the 15 Saudi hijackers, the Prince quoted a Koran passage that states, "Sometimes the soul veers towards evil." In his view, UBL succeeded in building a cult that appealed to a combination of religious fervor, nationalist impulse, and tribal affiliation. The concept of jihad against the infidel/oppressor became Al-Qaeda's most effective recruiting instrument, aimed at a succession of theatres in Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, and

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Kashmir.\* According to the Prince, most of the 19 hijackers went to Bosnia, Kosovo or Chechnya and became indoctrinated in Afghanistan after traveling through Pakistan and Iran. Once again, he emphasized that recruiting was broadened and completed outside the KSA, much as occurred in the case of the "New York 5." The Prince also pointed out that one British detainee trained in a Jewish school before joining UBL.

At the conclusion of the October 29 session, Prince Turki cited a speech he gave recently at Seton Hall University, in which he contrasted the memories that the families of the 9/11 victims still cherish of their lost loved ones with the Saudis' own horrible memory of having produced 15 murderers.

Looking to the future, the Prince favors a policy of engaging the Iranians and persuading them that a good relationship with the international community is in their interest. He is unaware of the KSA ever asking the US to accuse Iran publicly of responsibility for the Khobar Towers bombing. He said the KSA did not try to stop US retaliation against Iran. "As far as I know, the Kingdom never asked the US not to retaliate for Khobar."

**9-11 Commission Report**

The interview concluded with a question about what Prince Turki would like to see in the 9-11 Commission's final report. He asked that the Commission not "expurgate anything," in contrast to the 28 sealed pages of the Joint Inquiry report. Such tactics, the Prince stressed, makes working together much more difficult. As he put it, the KSA is prepared to accept its share of any blame that may be assigned, but fairness dictates that it know the questions and accusations directed at it.

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\* Interestingly, Prince Turki did not include Palestine on this list. Nor did he ever cite the Palestinian problem as a cause of the terrorist menace during either interview session, in contrast to most of the other Saudis interviewed during our trip.

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